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Project, and the agreement would forbid protest against construction
and development of the Project. The deletion of these components
illustrated the agreement intended only to resolve the water right
dispute between the parties, allowing Sanpete to pursue construction
of the Project. Carbon acted to halt the project through legitimate
avenues and political processes. Thus, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that
Carbon did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Holly Kirsner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding
under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, the Environmental
Protection Agency had the authority to list and determine total
maximum daily loads for all substandard rivers and waters, regardless
of the pollution source).
The plaintiffs, timber farmers, owned forested land along the
Garcia River in northern California. Once the farmers obtained their
timber-harvest permit, the California Department of Forestry imposed
restrictions designed to reduce soil erosion. The farmers contended
the costly and onerous restrictions were imposed in order to
implement total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") set by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for the Garcia River.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the farmers
challenged EPA's authority to impose TMDLs on rivers polluted only
by logging runoff or other nonpoint sources.
The farmers first argued the listing and TMDL requirements of
Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") applied only to point
sources, and therefore, water polluted only by nonpoint sources
should not be listed and no TMDL should be issued. The farmers
based their argument on the fact that effluent limitations-which
apply only to point sources-were referenced expressly in Section
303(d)'s listing requirements, whereas Section 303(d) made no
reference to nonpoint sources. The farmers asserted Congress
intended for states and EPA to address nonpoint sources in Section
319, which explicitly deals with nonpoint-source management
programs. According to the farmers, a water body that was polluted by
both point and nonpoint sources should be listed under both Sections
303(d) and 319 and the point and nonpoint sources should be
addressed pursuant to the respective listings. Thus, the Garcia River, a
water body impaired only by nonpoint sources, should not be listed
under 303(d) and no TMDL should be prepared.
The court rejected the farmers' argument for four reasons. First,
the purpose of placing a water body on a Section 303(d) substandard
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list was to trigger the TMDL requirement. The court found the
exclusion of rivers or waters polluted by nonpoint sources would
frustrate the CWA's comprehensive approach to addressing water
pollution.
Second, the court found the farmers' argument inconsistent with
Section 303(d)'s expressed logic. Section 303(d) required waterquality standards for both interstate and intrastate navigable waters.
The court reasoned that all rivers and waters, irrespective of the
pollution source, were included in the universe for which water quality
standards were required. Thus all waterbodies, regardless of the
pollution source, were included in the universe for which listing and
TMDLs were required.
Third, to exclude the large number of rivers and waters polluted
solely by nonpoint sources would leave a "chasm" in the otherwise
"comprehensive" statutory scheme. Fourth, the Ninth Circuit had
previously stated, although not directly on the precise issue, that the
TMDL process covers both nonpoint and point sources.
In their second argument, the farmers' contended the CWA's
legislative history showed that Congress elected to regulate only point
sources through Section 303(d). The court rejected this argument
finding the legislative history followed the court's previously adopted
CWA construction. Under the court's construction, a state must adopt
water-quality standards for waters polluted by point sources, as well as
nonpoint sources. The court stated if point-source effluent limitations
resolved the problem, then such limitations were sufficient. Under
Section 303(d), however, if effluent limitations were insufficient to
bring a waterway into compliance with standards, then the state must
list such substandard waters. For each listed river and water, the state
must establish TMDLs. The court found although Section 303(d) did
not expressly mention nonpoint sources, the state must list any
polluted waterway, whether polluted by point sources, nonpoint
sources, or a combination, if existing controls have failed to achieve
water-quality standards.
The farmers also argued Congress's 1987 enactment of Section 319
would have been unnecessary and superfluous if Section 303(d)
already encompassed nonpoint sources. The court rejected this
argument. First, while both Sections 303(d) and 319 required lists of
substandard rivers and waters, the listing criteria under the two
sections differ, thus resulting in two lists which may partially overlap,
but are not the same. Moreover, Section 319 did not address TMDLs
at all, whereas Section 303(d) required them. Second, the court
rejected the notion that the enactment of Section 319 was Congress's
first attempt to address nonpoint-source pollution. The court found
the 1972 CWA expressly addressed nonpoint sources. Finally, the
court followed Ninth Circuit precedent and rejected the farmers'
attempt to infer congressional intent for the 1972 CWA from the later
1987 CWA amendment. The court found Congress's statements that
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the 1987 amendment would be a "first step" or would "begin" the
process of addressing nonpoint-source pollution unconvincing in light
of the comprehensive approach adopted by the 1972 CWA.
Additionally, the court found that under the CWA, California must
incorporate TMDLs into its planning. However, the court also stated
California is free to select whatever, if any, land-management practices
it feels will achieve the load reductions called for by TMDLs.
Furthermore, California is free to moderate or modify the TMDL
reductions, or even refuse to implement them, pursuant to
countervailing state interests. Although such steps might provoke EPA
to withhold federal environmental grant money, California is free to
take that risk.
Finally, the court stated landowners possess avenues of redress.
Under the APA, landowners can challenge an EPA TMDL
determination for a given river reach or a specific Section 303(d)
listing as "arbitrary or capricious," "unsupported by substantial
evidence," or as an "abuse of discretion." Moreover, landowners may
show EPA's engineering is manifestly wrong. The farmers made no
such claim in this case. Therefore, the court entered judgment for
EPA.
Kis A. Zumalt
United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (holding the Government had standing to bring an action
under the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"); the Government was
not estopped from asserting that the public water system failed to
comply with total coliform rule; and officers, directors, and majority
shareholders of corporations that owned systems could be held
personally liable for violations of the SWDA).
The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") requires the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to establish and
enforce national standards regulating contaminants in drinking water
provided by public water systems.
The EPA Administrator
("Administrator") may grant primary enforcement of public water
systems to a state as long as state regulations are as strict as federal
regulations. The Administrator may bring a civil action for any
violation of the standards if requested by the state agency with
jurisdiction over water regulations compliance.
In California, the State Department of Health Services ("DHS")
had primary enforcement responsibility over public water systems.
DHS investigated Alisal Water Corporation ("Alisal") and other owners
of public water systems in December 1992 and found Alisal did not
comply with testing requirements for microbiological contaminants.
On August 15, 1996, DHS sent a letter to EPA requesting that EPA
bring a civil and/or criminal action for Alisal's violation of the SDWA.

